fewquestionsconcerningtheoriginsandtheconditionsofthis problem.Namely,iftheartofdanceisacceptedasoneofarts, anditis,whyaretheresofewphilosophicalreflectionswhich addressit?InFrancisSparshott'swords:"Ontheonehand,it hastraditionallybeenheldthatdancewasthefirstandinsome waysthemostfundamentalmanifestationofwhateveritisthat allfineartsmanifest.Ontheotherhand,thewaygeneralworks in aesthetics are written seldom reflects this estimate: dance aestheticsisnotassignedakeyroleinaesthetics,examplesused toillustrategeneralpointsareseldomdrawnfromdance,dance isnotassignedacentralplaceinsystemsoffinearts." 1 Thequestionis,obviously,nottobeboggeddownbyinspecting theartofdanceassuch,whichwas,aswehavealreadypointed out,recognized andacceptedas oneoffine arts.Moreorless equalwithothers,butasafineartnonetheless.Inmyopinion, theoriginsofthisproblemaretobesoughtinphilosophy,that isinaesthetics-inthewayitwasconceivedandorganized,so thatitexcludedprominentpositionofdance,whileatthesame timeincludingprominentpositionsofotherarts,suchasmusic, literature or painting. I do not want to say that the immanent constitution of aesthetics is such that it cannot give rise to a theoreticalconsiderationofdance,asifitwouldbeimpossible todevelopanaestheticsofdance.Onthecontrary,Iwouldlike tosuggestthatthereisnodifferencebetweendanceandother artsinthisrespect,artswhichdidgettheirprominentpositionin thedomainofaesthetics;thefactthatdanceisrarelyanalyzed is, therefore, even more striking. In other words, there is no specialqualityinstrinsictodancewhichmakesitmoredifficult fortheoreticalanalysisanditsverbalarticulationthantheother arts. Although philosophy will struggle with any of the arts, thembeingboundtononconceptualmediaofexpression,this problemwasneverseenasanobstacleforaestheticalresearch -atleastnotasonethatwouldcancelsuchresearchinadvance andforgood.
Ifthatisso,howarewetounderstandthatitwasduetoaesthetics thatwearetodayleftonlywithafewexamplesofdancebeing philosophically investigated and interpreted? Among various possible strategies of approach to this problem, I would like to propose the following one. Namely, I believe that there are specific presuppositions in philosophy which entered the domainofaestheticsandruledoveritsquestions,answersand concepts,makingaestheticsblindforthephenomenonofdance. Inotherwords,inalmostalltraditionalaestheticaltheoriesthere aregoverningideaswhichdonotbelongtoaestheticresearchas such,butareimportedfromother,widerphilosophicalpositions -sometimeseventhoseofthesameauthor.Giventhattheyare not of aesthetical origin in strict terms, such ideas can distort aestheticalthought,sincetheyshapeitsdomainofinvestigation in advance, not relying on the aesthetic phenomenon. Hence, they are governing ideas -regulative ones, in Kantian terms: they are accepted in advance, and so they influence the domain of aesthetic research in advance. If those ideas would be excluded from the aesthetical research, it would, perhaps, becomemore opentothepossibility ofdrawingits questions, concepts, arguments and positions exclusivelly from the aestheticexperience,fromtheaestheticphenomenon. Ifweapplythislineofthoughttotheproblemoftherebeingno oralmostnoaestheticaltheoryofdance,theconsequencewould betheideathatdancewasnotseenasaprominentartbecause ofsomeofthosegoverningandregulativenonaestheticalideas. In other words, the consequence is that aesthetics of dance could be truly possible only if aesthetics could be freed from suchwiderphilosophicalpresuppositionsanddirectedtowards the phenomenon of dance, that is the phenomenon of dance as is lived and experienced both in the production and in the receptionofthisfineart.
Suchanideais,surely,tobeprovedbymoreconcreteanalysis. However,forsuchananalysistobecomplete,itwouldrequire questioning of various and numerous concepts, ideas and positionsusuallyconsideredtobeadequateforbothdescription andanalysisofdance,bothinlayandinacademiccontext.In thisessayIwillfocusononlyonesuchexample,namelyonthe questionofthesubjectofdance:whoisitthatactuallydances? Inmyopinion,thisquestionisofsomeimportanceforthestudy ofdance,sincetheideathatitisthemind,thesoul-andnotthe body-thatrepresentsthepropersubjectofdancewasoneofthe mostinfluentialofgoverningandregulatingideasthatdefined positionsoftraditionalaestheticsinitsrelationshiptodance. BeforeweanalyzetherelationshipoftheseideasofDescartes withtheproblemoftheaestheticsofdance,orthelackofit,first itshouldbeshownthatareferencetoDescartes'smetaphysicsis notamatterofinterpretation,butthematterofthefacticaldance experience and its understanding. Namely, the problem of the absenceoftheaestheticsofdancegaineditsvisibilityduringthe secondhalfofthe20thcentury.Authorswhoreflecteduponthis problemoftencriticizedtraditionalphilosophyasbeingtoorigid andtoomuchrationallyorientatedtoelucidatethephenomenon of dance. Among many issues then considered to be origins of the neglect of dance, the question of body is especially accentuated:asdanceisunimaginablewithoutthebodydancing, such focus is not very surprising. However, the ironical twist hereisthatitactuallyshouldbesurprising,fortheargumentof danceaestheticianswasthatitwasexactlythebodyassuchthat was neglected in traditional philosophy, and, consequently, in traditionalaesthetics. 8 Inotherwords,theproblemoftheabsence ofdanceis,actually,onlytheconsequenceofthecorresponding absence of body: traditional philosophy being orientated on mindanditsfeatures,beitrationalorsensecognition,ithadno senseforbodyassuch,andcouldnotallowforittoemergeasa philosophicalproblemeveninthemodeofdance.
Mindbodygap:isdanceonlyinourheads?
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Herewehaveastrikingexampleofpreviouslypresentedthesis thattraditionalaestheticsinitsapproachtodancewasunderthe influenceofnonaesthetic,widerphilosophicalideas.However, the problem to which dance aestheticians reacted was not merelytheproblemoftraditionalphilosophybeingblindtothe phenomenonofbodyanddance,butmoretheproblematicfact thatithastransferedthoseideasintotheverypracticeofdance -that is, into the way dancers and coreographers themselves understandtheirart,eveniftheydidnothaveanycontactwith thehistoryofphilosophy.AsSondraHortonFraleighshows,not just dance theory, but the dance practice as such was infused withideasthatmind(orsoul)andbodyaretwoseparateentities, in terms of body being mindless, i.e. body being only an instrumentfortheworkingsofthemind.
10 Assuch,mindbody gap reveals itself as far more sinister: it arranges in advance theveryproductionofdance,bothintermsofcoreographyand danceperformance.
Fraleighanalyzestheproblemintoitselements:themindbody gapisinscribedintheartofdancewhileitispresenteveninthe educationalprocessofbecomingadancer.Inordertobecomea dancer,onehasto'ruleover'one'sbody-tobeabletocontrol it,todisciplineit,sothebodywoulddowhateversoulandmind demandofittodo.
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Thefactisundeniable-asallofusknow,it takesyearsofexhaustingexercizetobeabletodoarabesqueor manege.However,factsarenotinquestionhere-theproblem liesintheirinterpretation:weshould'control'and'discipline' thebody,makeitaproper'instrument'ofthemindand/orsoul. Therefore, if we are to control, discipline, and rule over the body,makingitsubjecttoourintentions,thenthebodyisnot thesubjectofdance-itisaninstrumentofdance.
Such understanding of dance involves several other consequences: namely, if the body is merely an instrument of dance,anditisaninstrumenttobeused bythemindandthe soul, then the true subject of dance is the mind (or the soul). Hence,itisthesoulthattrulydances,sincetheveryessenceof danceisproducedbyit-andnotbythebody,whichismerely usedforsuchessencetobemanifestedinmaterialrealm,inres extensa,orinthepublicdomain.Therefore,danceisessentially notabodilyevent,buttheeventoftheexpressionofstatesof mind,maytheybeofcognitiveorofemotionalcharacter.So, we've reached the origin of previously mentioned inversion: althoughdanceisunimaginablewithoutsomebodydancing,it is nevertheless often undestood as nonbodily in its character. Such paradox, once revealed as a paradox, is seemingly easy solved-thebodyshouldbereturnedtodance,anddancetothe body. However, as I will show further on, aesthetics of dance willfindthissolutionratherproblematic.
Anotherconsequenceofthesamedualisticapproachtotheartof danceistheprimacyofthecoreography,i.e.ofthecoreographer. 12 Namely,oncethebodyisexpelledfromdance,andproclaimed tobeitsinstrumentonly,thereisnoneedforthesubjectofdance to be literally the person dancing, that is now their soul. The subjectofdancecouldnowbetheauthorofdance,thecreatorof itsideawhichistobeembodiedviathebodyastheinstrument -and that body does not have to be the body of the one and thesameperson.Therefore,ifthedanceisessentialynotinthe body,butinthesoul,thereisnoneedforittobeinthesoulofthe dancer:nowcoreographercanstepforwardasthetruesubject ofdance,sinceitishewhoconceivesit,whotrulycreatesthe dance. 13 Inthoseterms,dancersarereducedtolittlemorethan theirbodies:theirsoulsshouldrecievetheideaofdancefrom coreographerandapplyittotheirbodies,sodancersaremerely interpreters-notproperartists.
Ifwearetoinvolvetheaudienceinthislittlesketch,itwould represent the final 'magnetic ring' of this rather platonistic hierarchy: namely, according to such understanding of dance, the audience is to enjoy the original idea of the coreographer, andnotthebodilymovementsofdancersperse.Giventhatthose movementsmerelyembodytheoriginalideamadeinthesoulof the coreographer, it is just that idea that sould be recognized inthereceptionofdance,althoughitistranslatedintoanother realm, the realm of res extensa.
14 Disproportion of the senses primarilyusedintheperformanceofdanceandinitsreception alsoendorsessuchinterpretation:thedancerisnotdifferentiated from the dance he is performing, so he cannot see himself in themannerinwhichapianistcanhearhimselfplaying. 
Dancingbodyanddanceaesthetics
Traditional philosophical ideas I previously sketched with regard to the problem of the subject of dance, the primacy of souloverthebody,donotbelongtothephenomenonofdance assuch.Aswehaveseen,thoseideasoriginatefromthegeneral metaphysical and epistemological domains of philosophy, and theyorganizeaestheticalapproachtothephenomenonofdance in advance. Such aesthetical analysis of dance, however, is to be understood as its specific interpretation, problematic in some of its core concepts and ideas, which can be questioned andchanged.Inthisrespect,aestheticsofdancemerelyfollows the same line of development which was taken by aesthetics as such: namely, in the period of modern ages aesthetics was slowly,butconstantlyreleasingitselffromthemetaphysicaland epistemological influences, to which it was subjected during centuriesofphilosophicalquestioningofaestheticalproblems, sincePlatoandAristotlesonwards.
The idea that dance should be freed from such constrains of modern metaphysics and epistemology was first actualized through abandoning of the mindbody gap I've previously analyzed.Namely,theideathatthesoulisthesubjectofdance and that the body is merely its instrument, perhaps even its object,isnowreplacedbytheideathatitisthebodythatdances, i.e.thatthebodyisthetruesubjectofdance.Suchreversalis plainenough:sincetheartofdancecannotbeconcievedwithout the body, here we apply Occam's razor -we will not accept complicatedexplanationsiftherecouldbeofferedmoresimple ones.Inotherwords,wearetostartwithminimalconditionsof dance,andnotprogresstoacceptother,morecomplicatedones ifthatisnotnecessary.Therefore,westartwiththebody:itis thebodythatdances.
However, as it was the case with previously described interpretationofdancebeingactualizedbythesoul,theideathat the body is its true subject also implies certain consequences. Firstly, the idea goes against the understanding of body as an instrument; secondly, it goes against the primacy of the coreographer;andthirdly,itimpliesthatthecontentandmeaning ofdanceshouldbederivedfromthebody-thattheynolonger have purely mental character. Now, if the body is no longer to be considered as an instrument of the soul, then the origin of dance cannot be the coreographer anymore, since he does not dance, does not work with his own body.The primacy of danceproductionis,thus,returnedtothedancer.However,such primacyisnoworientatedonthedancer'sbody,notonhissoul: therefore,thebodyhastobeunderstoodasactiveandartistically creative-notaspassiveanymore.Ifthebodyisinterpretedasthe trueoriginofdance,italsohastobeunderstoodas'intelligent' notasmerematter,deprivedofmind.
Nevertheless, such consequences and ideas are problematic in few respects. Firstly, if the body is now accepted as the true subject of dance, where does that leave us with respect to the soul?Doesthismeanthatthesoul,themind,andmentalevents ingeneralhavenothingtodowithdance?Thisproblemis,once again,toberesolvedinmoregeneralandnotstrictlyaesthetical terms.Namely,inquestionhereisnotonlytheideathatmental eventsarethetrueoriginofdance,buttheverydifferentiation ofmindandbody.Therefore,bystatingthatthebodyisthetrue subjectofdanceaestheticiansdonotjustclaimthatthemindor the soul have nothing to do with dance.On the contrary, they are challengingthe very division, the very separation of mind andbodythatwastheparadigmuponwhichtraditionaldance aestheticsrelied.Hence,suchquestioningwouldalsohavesome anthropologicalconsequences,ifnotevenmetaphysicalones.
Tostatethatthebodyisthetruesubjectofdance,then,implies that there is no gap between mind and body, i.e. that their differentiationisfalse.Inthisrespect20thcenturyaestheticsof dancereachesoutforanotherwiderphilosophicalbackground, namely for phenomenology, which offered it philosophical means for challenging the mindbody opposition. At first glance, such strategy does not seem as very innovative: if the traditional aesthetics reached out for the main metaphysical andepistemologicalpositionsofitsera,20thcenturyaesthetics reachesoutforanalternative,butagainnotintermsofdeveloping aestheticaltheoryoutoftheaestheticphenomenonassuch-it reliesuponalreadyformedphilosophicalpositions.
However,therearetwomaindifferencesinthetraditionalandthe 20thcenturyapproach.Firstly,whiletraditionalaestheticsrelied onphilosophicalbackgroundwithoutquestioningsuchstrategy, 20thcenturyaestheticsofdancereachesoutforphenomenology with clear purpose of findining alternative for the traditional model,thatisonlyintermsofcriticizingtraditionalpositions. Therefore, phenomenology is here used for clearing the area of aesthetical research so it would be able to approach to the phenomenon of dance, as it is present in aesthetic experence. Muchinthespiritofthephenomenologicalmethod.
Secondly, phenomenology is here chosen as a weapon of choice by no chance. Namely, the second gerenation of phenomenologiststurnedmuchmoretoproblemsofbodyand perception; Maurice MerlauPonty being the most prominent ofthem.MerleauPontyofferedanewperspectiveonthebody, criticizingtheverydogmaofmodernsicence-thatallbodiesare essentialy only modes of the unique matter, mechanicistically explained.Inoppositiontomechanicisticworldview,Merleau Ponty opted for the idea of a sensitive, lived body, for the difference clearly experienced between our own, human body andtheotherbodies,towhichwerelateviaourbody.
15 Thus, thelevelingofthehumanbodytoamerematerialobjectishere cancelled,onlytoopenthenewpossibilityofthehumanbody to be considered active, sensible, creative and even thinking. Therefore,traditionaloppositionbetweenthesoulandthebody isnowtransformedintotheunityofthecognitivebody,ofthe bodyendowedwithfeaturespreviouslyascribedtothesoul.
TheinfluenceofMerleauPonty'sphilosophyontheaesthetics of dance is clearly shown in Fraleigh's analysis of dance. 16 Moreover, Maxine SheetsJohnstone, another important dance aesthetician, points out to the possibilities of using the phenomenological method not just in terms of departure from the traditional positions, but also for the positive and creative developmentofaestheticalanalysisofdance.
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Infollowinglines Iwilltrytoanalyzefewcrucialconsequencesofsuchapproach. Now, if the body is the subject of dance, what does it mean? Surely,itmeansthatitisthebody,andnotthesoul,whichis creating the dance and understaning it completely, in a bodily manner; the question of bodily knowledge is here to arise. To statethisistosaythatincreatingdancethebodyisnotmerely dancing,producingmovesandpossesingthespace,adescription is adequate for the traditional understaning of the body as an instrument. So, there has to be more: the body has to be the subject of dance, that is it has to produce dance in terms we earlierascribedtothesoul.Thus,itisnotaquestionofthebody thatknowshowtodocertainmoves,beacuseitwastrainedtodo them,butmorethequestionofthebodybeingabletoknowwhat itisdoing.So,thequestionwouldnowbeistheresomekindof bodilyrationalitycomparablewiththerationalknowledgeofthe traditionalsoul?
Surely,tousetermslike'bodilyrationality'or'bodilyknowledge' heresoundsproblematic,sincerationalityandknowledgewere traditionallyascribedtothesoul,andnottothebody;itisexactly thissortofinversionthatdanceaestheticianswanttointroduce with their theories. To illustrate: 'On the prereflective level thereisnopossibilityofbeing'selfconscious'inthesenseof apprehendingthebodyasanobject.Ontheprereflectivelevel, consciousnesscanonlyexistitsbodyasthecontingencyofits being,astheinescapablestructureofitsexistence.Assuch,it is the unreflectedupon, lived experience which pinpoints the consciousnessbody relationship at the primary ontological level.' 18 Therefore, if we accept such an idea, it would mean that 'knowledge', 'rationality' or 'selfawareness' of the body is realized on primeval level, out of which every idea of soul beingrationalorselfawareisfurthertobededuced.The'self awareness' of the body is, thus, realized in a manner of sheer selfpresence, which is to be understood as the fundamental phenomenonofhumanexistence,'onephenomenonthatnever leavesus '. 19 However, the idea of the body being creative or knowing by itselfisboundtoagainphenomenologicallyquestioningthe realm of sense perception and searching for its basic form. In thecaseofdanceaesthetics,asitis,forexample,shownwith 17SheetsJohnstone, M. (1966) (visuality, audibility, etc.) are never pure, but always refering backtomorebasichorizonwheretheyareallinterconnected.
Suchstrategyoftheprimacyofbodilymovementaimsformore aestheticpurposes:forexample,ifthebodyisnowplacedasa subjectofdance,receptionofdancealsohastobeplacedinto the body, but this time into the bodies of spectators. In other words, following this interpretation, it would be wrong to assumethatthereceptionofdanceistoberesolvedexclusively on the level of visual perception, because visual perception is onlybasedonthismorefundamentalbodilykinaestheticlevelof 'perception'. 23 Therefore,aestheticexperienceofdanceisalsoto beexplainedasakinaestheticphenomenon,groundedinthefact thatspectatorstoohavethisspecifickinaestheticknowledgevia theirownbodies.Surely,spectatorswouldnotdance,exceptin somespecificcases,buttheycanneverthelessexperiencedance as a kinaesthetic phenomenon since their own selfawareness is primarily based in the kinaesthetic experience of their own bodies.Nevertheless,thisisnotthecaseofprojectingmovement seen onto one's own body and its selfawareness: it is much morethecaseofreactingkinaestheticallyonthekinaesthetical phenomenon, recognized via synesthesia, that is via mutual cooperationofmultiplesenses.
Aswecansee,theveryrealmofkinaestheticexperience,being fundamental and grounding for more concrete experiences of specific senses, such as vision, is here doubled, both in the context of art production and of art reception, somewhat repeatingthemindbodygapoftraditionalphilosophy.Surely, thereisnogaphere,notinthefullsenseoftheword,butthere isadifferentiationbetweentwolayersofthesameexperience -one considered to be more basic and fundamental, and the othertobemorepresenttothebody's'eye'.Forexample,inthe caseofreceptionthereisthesurfacelayerofvisualperception following the dance, and the more fundamental kinaesthetical layerofthebodyassuch,whichallowsforthevisualperception to convey much more than merely seeing the body conveys fromoneplaceinthespacetotheother.Thekinaestheticallayer shouldallowsustofeelthedance,andnotjusttoseeitmove.
In the case of production, the body that dances is at the same timebyitself,behindandinfrontofitself,sinceitisawareof its previous movement, of the movement it does at the given moment of time, and of the movement which is yet to come. The dancer has double selfawarenes, since 'A prereflective awarenessofspaceisthusalsointrinsictoanylivedexperience of consciousnessbody; hence, intrinsic to the dancer's lived experience of the dance'. 24 Therefore, to be able to dance, dancer has to be present to himself in a very special mode of selfawareness:hehastoknowhiscurrentbodilypositionand the one that is immediately to come, without having time to rationallythinkitthrough-hehastoactinthemoment,without pause. The same goes for awarenes that the current bodily positionwasaconsequenceofthepreviousone.
Suchselfawareness,aswecansee,istheveryideaofbodily (kinaesthetic) selfawareness, as presented by, for example, SheetsJohnstone.
25 However,althoughpositedasanuniqueflow ofbodilypositionsandcopresentawarenes,suchexplanation stillimpliesadoublingmuchsimilartotheonementionedwith regardtoreceptionofdance.Thequestionstillremains-isthis doubling,then,aconsequenceoftraditionalideasstillsecretly present even in this reversed aesthetics of dance, proclaiming bodytobeitssubject?Orisitaneffectoftwomainpositions from which we are considering the phenomenon of dance, production and reception? It seems that the idea of the body as the subject of dance demands bluring of the line between productionandreception:theyarebothexplainedbyreference tokinaestheticbasisofhumanexperience,andtheybothhave 24SheetsJohnstone,M.(1966) ThePhenomenologyofDance, p.28. 25Ibid, pp.3537. more productive and active, as well as more receptive and passiveside.Perhapsitevendemandsforthefinalequationof those positions. Nevertheless, those and similar questions still did not find their proper answers in contemporary aesthetics ofdance;ontheotherhand,theydorevealthedirectionofits futuredevelopment. Anotherproblemforfurtherdevelopmentofdanceaestheticsis thehermeneuticalone.Namely,althoughexpressedinvarious terms and in more than a few attempts to distort traditional conceptsandtoinventnewones,conceptsmoreadequatetothe aestheticsofdanceandforgedoutoftheaestheticexperienceof dance,mostdanceaestheticsagreeinonepoint:theartofdance isnotmeremechanicmovementofthematerialbodywhichis endowed with some additional and unexplicable meaning. On thecontrary,theveryprocessofdanceisimmanentlymeaningful sinceitintrinsicallyinvolvestransformationofthedancer-ofthe dancer'sself,wemayadd.
26 Inotherwords,themeaningfulness ofdanceisproducedsolelybythebodyinitsmovement,butits constitutionisdefinedbythefactthattheexperienceofdance is,byitsverycharacter,transformative(andcreative)-forthe danceraswellasfortheaudience.However,ifthatisso,then theanalysisofdanceisconfiedtoahermeneuticcircle:thereis nosolidgrounduponwhichitcouldbuilditsfindings,forthat ground-thephenomenonofdanceisinconstantmovement andchange.InMcNamara'swords:'Inlightofthisandtheother hermeneutic phenomenological principles discussed above, any investigation of a dance phenomenon is not only about understandingwhatthemeaningofthatphenomenonis,butalso about the processes of the investigator's own construction of meaningaswell.' 27 Inmyopinion,inanattempttorevealitasthephenomenonof importanceforaesthetics,aestheticaltheoriesofdanceupuntill nowfocusedmoreonfindingthisdancespecificrealmandthe backgroundhorizonforitsanalysisthanondevelopingprecise interpretationsofthefieldthey'vediscovered.Therefore,they are still not precise and developed enough in more than one respect. Still, it is also my opinion that future analysis of this fieldofaestheticscouldbe veryfruithfulnotonlyin terms of elucidatingthequestionofdance,butalsointermsofofferingnew perspectivesforphilosophyofartingeneral.Byinvestigating therealmofbodyinmotion,ofkinaestheticphenomenonasthe
